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Article 3

THE CATHOLIC LAWYER AND DIVORCE CASES
You are a fairly successful lawyer. Through hard work
you have won recognition in your community as a capable
attorney. You are also a Catholic, and you insist that you
are loyal to your religion.
A Mrs. Lloyd Smith approaches you and requests your
services in order- to obtain a divorce. Both she and her
estranged husband are prominent in your locality, and the
publicity you would gain in handling the case would undoubtedly increase your standing as a legal expert.
What will you do? Will you take the case once you have ascertained that your prospective client has good legal grounds
for a divorce? Will you bother to inquire whether she is a
Catholic? A Protestant? A Jewess? Will the question of her
religion, or the lack of it, make any difference in your decision
to take, or to refuse to take the case? If any misgivings on
the score of religion at all enter your mind, will you dispel
them promptly with the thought that civil law is your profession and the case awaiting your service is held by your
associates at the bar as legitimate and dignified legal work?
The law is your business, let the client be concerned about
matters of conscience, and before God!
Or perhaps you will try to bring out a little more cogent
reason and argue with yourself that your work as an attorney
before the bar in civil law is confined to the civil effects of
marriage, and that all other effects flowing from the court's
decision are outside of your responsibility.
The Pope in an address to the lawyers of Italy a few years
ago gives a decided jolt to so complacent an answer. His
words on this particular point were addressed especially to
judges, but there can be no doubt that they apply with equal
force to attorneys. He said: 1
1

41 ACTA AP0STOLCAE SEDiS 997, 603 (1949).
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A Catholic judge cannot grant a decree of divorce (where
that is permitted) for a marriage valid before God and the
Church, except for reasons of great weight. He should not
forget that such a decree in practice not only reaches the civil
effects but in fact serves to foster the mistaken view that the
bond is actually severed, and that a subsequent one is valid
and binding.

Through his active participation in the court proceedings the
attorney surely shares in the responsibility for these gravely
evil consequences.
Can a Catholic lawyer ease his conscience by throwing the
blame entirely on the law-makers? Pius XII himself asserts
that the civil statutes allowing for divorce are unjust. If the
laws are unjust, then the law-makers are the wrong-doers.
The blame for the evils of divorce rests squarely on the
shoulders of the legislators. Does this exculpate both judges
and attorneys? The Holy Father answers in the negative: 2
For every sentence the principle obtains that the judge cannot easily and simply refuse the responsibility of his decision
by throwing it all on the law and its authors. These certainly
are primarily responsible for the effects of the law in question.
But the judge who by his decision applies it to a particular case
is co-cause and therefore co-responsible for the effects.

Judges and lawyers cannot twist free of the fact that their
work towards the granting of a decree of divorce for the
plaintiff is a cooperation in an evil action.
Will a Catholic lawyer's practice suffer if he is conscientious
and heeds the moral issues involved in divorce suits? That is
debatable. At any rate I am sure that Catholic lawyers will
agree wholeheartedly with the New York lawyer, Godfrey
Schmidt, who points the finger of scorn at those lawyers who
build up a "successful" legal profession on failures in marriage.3
Id. at 602.
Palmer, Godfrey Schmidt and the Full Life, 17 CATHoLic DicnsT 121, 126
(July 1953).
2
3
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Lawyers themselves are appalled at the purely legalistic
attitude in this matter. An association of lawyers at a recent
meeting went on record as recommending that the attorney
who is asked to undertake divorce proceedings should first try
to reconcile the couple. Legislators, too, are disturbed. The
State of Illinois just passed a law which calls for a sixty-day
"cooling-off period" after the petition for divorce.4
Does this mean that a Catholic lawyer is bound in conscience to refuse absolutely to cooperate with a plaintiff suing
for a divorce? We might answer simply along with an eminent
moral theologian that "generally speaking" he must refuse to
take such cases.5 But given the vast number of divorce pleas
today, the whole question merits a rather thorough re-examination. Accordingly, I propose to examine briefly first of all
the general principles involved in the lawyer's action when
he institutes divorce proceedings for a client; then, to scrutinize the application of these principles to Catholic clients, to
baptized non-Catholic, and to non-baptized persons.
A. The GeneralPrinciples
Civil laws granting divorce are, for the most part, morally
wrong because the State therein usurps an authority to which
it has no right whatsoever. "What therefore God has joined
together, let no man put asunder." (Matt.19:7). It should
be obvious that the State unlawfully invades an area in which
it has no competence when it claims the power to dissolve a
marriage lawfully contracted by two baptized persons. Such
a contract is a Sacrament. Christian marriage, then, belongs
to the Church, and not to the Civil authorities. The Church
acknowledges that she herself has not the power to dissolve
such a marriage, once it has been consummated.'
4

ILL. STAT. ANN. C. 109, § 109.188(1)

5

CONNELL, MORALS IN POLITICS AND PROFESSIONS 110

(Supp. 1953).

(1946).
6 "A valid matrimony 'ratum et consumatum' can be dissolved by no human
power and by no cause, except death." CODEX 1URIS CANoNICI, canon 1118 (1918).
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But it is also true that the State is powerless to dissolve the
bond of matrimony contracted by non-baptized persons. God,
not the State, has joined them together and has ratified their
contract. Only God can loosen the bond by which the two are
joined together as husband and wife. In this sense the conjugal society is above and beyond the State.
Does this mean that the civil authority has no jurisdiction
at all over marriage? No. The State has a certain control
over marriage in two areas. First, in the opinion of a great
number of moral theologians the State has within its competence the authority to lay down certain conditions prerequisite for the validity of a marriage contract between nonbaptized persons, as, for example, a minimum age, etc. And,
when these conditions required by law can be proved not to
have been present, the State can annul the marriage. In such
cases, however, the action of the State consists in officially
declaring that there never was a genuine marriage. Once the
marriage has been validly contracted, the State is absolutely
powerless to void the contract.
Divorce (the dissolution of a true marriage bond) differs
essentially from annulment (official declaration that no valid
bond ever existed). I might mention here in passing that the
wording of State laws in this matter does not always accord
with the terminology of Canon Law.
Secondly, the State has lawful jurisdiction over the civil
effects of marriage. It can, for example, pass laws concerning
the ownership of property of husband and wife; laws concerning inheritance, and the like. It has also the right and the
duty to protect public decency, and to punish bigamy and
adultery.
Pope Pius XII in the address quoted above said that a
Catholic judge may grant a decree of divorce only for "reasons of great weight." This statement implies that the granting of the decree is not intrinsically wrong, that is, not
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morally wrong in and by itself. For no one may cooperate in
an act intrinsically wrong for even the gravest of reasons.
Canonists and moral theologians are almost in perfect
agreement that the civil decree of divorce is not intrinsically
wrong.7 They argue something like this: the decree of divorce
granted by a civil magistrate results in the severance of the
bond which was caused by the civil marriage. Now this
"bond" is not a true conjugal bond objectively (dearly so
when the parties involved are held to the ecclesiastical
"form", even though the legislator intends it to have this
efficacy). Rather, it is merely a legal bond before civil society
causing some civil effects. Consequently the civil decree of
divorce cannot be intrinsically wrong insofar as it touches
the civil bond. For just as the contracting of a civil marriage
is not intrinsically wrong inasmuch as it aims at producing
certain civil effects only (and therefore has no influence whatsoever on the genuine matrimonial bond, but only on something superadded to this bond), .so also the removal of the
civil part by a decree of divorce is not intrinsically wrong.
The true conjugal bond remains intact.
This conclusion that civil divorce is not per se evil holds up
even though the legislator and those suing for divorce intend
to dissolve completely the matrimonial bond itself. For in this
case the evil would arise from the perverse intention of the
judge trying to exceed his competence, or from other circumstances extrinsic to the divorce decree objectively considered.
The manner in which this argument has been presented
may seem to leave untouched the case of a complete divorce
granted to those who are not baptized, or who are not held
to the "form" of marriage in the Church. Nevertheless there
does not appear to be sufficient grounds for taking the decree
of divorce as having a different significance for different
7 See, e.g., THE CATHOLiC LAWyES- GunD,
CANON LAW ON CIvm AcTioN 3m
MAUIAGE PROBLEMS (1944); 2 GASPA- I, DE MATim OIo 1311 (1932); Abellan,

De Sententia Fundata in Lege Iniusta, 39 Periodica5 (1990).
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groups. If in the first case it signified the suppression of the
civil effects merely, so likewise in the second. Neither the
law nor the courts make any distinction in their decree.
In the light of arguments such as the one just advanced
there does not seem to be room for a reasonable doubt that
the decree of the court granting a divorce is not intrinsically
wrong.
Nevertheless this decree almost always, if not always,
breeds effects that are seriously evil. As the Holy Father
pointed out, it tends to create the erroneous impression that
the marriage bond itself is actually and completely severed.
In many cases it paves the way for a subsequent marriage of
one or both parties. It exerts a very strong influence in weakening the moral integrity of individual, the family, the community, the nation.
The Catholic lawyer may not formally concur nor cooperate in what is generally intended by the court, namely the
severance of the marriage bond itself and the rendering of the
plaintiff legally capable of contracting a subsequent marriage.
If he ever has a just reason for rendering legal service to one
suing for a divorce from a valid marriage, he must confine
his formal cooperation (that is, his sincere will and intention)
to the obtaining of a release from the civil effects alone for
his client.
In spite of this he does share, of course, in the responsibility
for the further effects of the decree of divorce which are often
morally evil. But in the situation here envisaged his cooperation in the evil consequences would be material, not
formal. In order that he may permit this, he must have a
proportionate good resulting from his action to balance the
evil effect or effects. In other words, there is the possibility
that his cooperation in obtaining the divorce may be justified
on the principle of double effect. When he may justly call
upon the principle to defend his undertaking divorce proceed-
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ings for a client can be more easily elucidated in the discussion
of specific cases to be taken up in a moment.
This is perhaps the best place to make two general, but
important remarks. First, the Catholic lawyer's dilemma in
this matter is not exactly on a par with that of a judge. The
lawyer is practically always free to refuse to take a case,
while the judge sometimes is obliged to hear cases as they
present themselves to him.
Second, the lawyer must do his best to avoid scandal by his
action. If, then, he has sufficient reason for undertaking divorce proceedings, he must as a rule make it known publicly
that he does not acknowledge the court's competence to dissolve the marriage bond itself.
B. The Application of the Principles
1. The Catholic Plaintiff Seeking a Divorce.
A civil divorce which guarantees to one of the parties the
protection of the State against molestation is sometimes useful, when the Church permits the couple to separate and live
apart for serious reasons. In the language of the Church this
is called a separation a thoro et mensa.
The Third Council of Baltimore, however, forbids Catholics in the United States to apply to the civil authority for
such a divorce without first obtaining the permission of the
ecclesiastical authority.
A synod held in the diocese of Providence, R. I. on October
8, 1952, issued the following significant decrees: 8
Catholics may not, under pain of mortal sin, approach the
civil courts to obtain a civil separation, divorce or annulment
for any reason whatsoever unless the permission of the bishop
first has been obtained.
Furthermore, a Catholic lawyer may not, under pain of
mortal sin, approach the civil courts as attorney for a plaintiff
8 National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service, Nov. 3, 1952.
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seeking either a separation, divorce or annulment of a marriage
which has been contracted before a Catholic priest unless the
plaintiff or the lawyer has first obtained the permission of the
bishop to institute proceedings.
A Catholic lawyer may represent the respondent in cases of
civil separation, divorce or annulment of a marriage which has
been contracted before a Catholic priest only on condition
that both lawyer and respondent will do their utmost under law
to protect the bond of marriage and sincerely contest the action
of separation, divorce or annulment which was initiated without
the required permission.

These decrees do hardly anything more than spell out what
is already contained in Canon Law. The fact that they bind
under pain of mortal sin serves to show how serious this whole
matter is considered by the authorities in the Church. In
localities where the diocesan statutes do not legislate the
practice of the Catholic lawyer in so detailed and explicit a
manner, his position is none-the-less very much the same as
in Providence. The statutes of the Third Council of Baltimore
bind all Catholics within the United States, and that Council
laid down that the permission of the ecclesiastical authorities
must be obtained before the civil court may be approached
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. The Catholic lawyer
would be cooperating in a seriously sinful act, if he went
ahead and pleaded a case for divorce knowing that the permission has not been obtained. If the prospective client seems
to be unaware that such ecclesiastical permission is necessary,
the lawyer has the obligation of giving this information and
advice.
If the party requesting the lawyer's service refuses to put
the case before the proper ecclesiastical authorities, and
above all, if he or she is seeking a civil divorce in view of a
subsequent marriage, the Catholic lawyer must almost always
withhold his services. It is hard to conceive of a good that
might come out of his cooperation to compensate for the
serious evil that is sure to follow. The fee that the lawyer
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stands to lose in rejecting the case can under no circumstances
justify such action on his part.9
Catholic lawyers should get acquainted with the officials of
the Chancery Office of the diocese in which they practice law.
They should cooperate loyally with the Church authorities
and keep informed on any specific diocesan regulation that
concerns them or possible clients.
You will notice that the decree of the Synod of Providence
lays down the requirement of ecclesiastical permission in
order to approach the civil courts to obtain a divorce of a
marriage "which has been contracted before a Catholic
priest." Strictly speaking this ecclesiastical permission is not
required if a Catholic is seeking a civil divorce of a marriage
attempted before a non-Catholic minister or a justice of
peace. In the eyes of the Church one who has been baptized
a Catholic cannot validly contract marriage except before a
priest who possesses ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The permission of the Church is not needed to seek to put an end to an
entanglement that is repudiated by the Church.
2. The Baptized Non-Catholic Plaintiff Seeking A Divorce.
By "baptized non-Catholic" is meant one who was baptized
in a Christian religion other than Roman Catholic. If the
parties to the matrimonial contract were validly baptized,
even though the baptism was conferred in a non-Catholic
religion, their marriage is a genuine sacrament. The Church
recognizes their marriage as true and valid.
In principle the marriage of baptized non-Catholics is subject to the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church. Canon Law
clearly makes this claim of the Church: "Cases of matrimony
between baptized persons by right belong properly and exclusively to the ecclesiastical judge," "oIt is hardly likely,
9 3 NOLDIn-SCHMITT, SUMMA TnHEoLoGIAE MoRAis 682, n. 672 (26th ed. 1940).
10 CODEX IURIS CANONici, canon 1960 (1918).
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however, that any non-Catholic will acknowledge this authority of the Catholic Church. Nor is the Catholic lawyer
obliged to seek the permission of the bishop of his diocese to
take legal action in order to obtain a divorce for such parties.
To a certain extent he is thrown on his own discretion. Here
in general is how the matter shapes up for him.
If the baptized non-Catholic is seeking a civil divorce
merely to obtain the sanction and protection of the State to
live separated from his or her mate safe from molestation
and the like, there seems to be no valid reason why the
Catholic lawyer cannot handle the case, provided the cause
for such a petition is sufficiently serious. He should, however,
try to reconcile the couple first, and advise on ways to
remedy the friction between them.
If the baptized non-Catholic is seeking a civil divorce in
view of a subsequent marriage, the Catholic lawyer ought to
refuse to have anything to do with the case, at least for the
general run of such cases that comes his way.
It could well be, however, that a careful scrutiny of the
case will sometimes reveal that the marriage from which a
divorce is sought was never valid. For example, since January
1, 1949, all who have been baptized in the Catholic Church,
whether they were raised as Catholics or not, are held to the
"form" of matrimony in the Church, that is, for validity their
marriage contract must be made before a lawfully authorized
Catholic priest. 1 If it be found, therefore that either the
plaintiff or the respondent was baptized a Catholic and that
the wedding took place before a Protestant minister or a
justice of peace, after January 1, 1949, the parties in the eyes
of the Church are not truly united in marriage. In such an
eventuality a Catholic lawyer certainly could profer his services toward obtaining the desired civil divorce.
11

40 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 305 (1948).
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There are other circumstances in which a marriage between
baptized non-Catholics could be found to be invalid, and in
which a civil divorce decree would be tantamount to a declaration of nullity. Baptized non-Catholics are subject as well as
Catholics to the legislation of the Church on marriage, unless
they have been explicitly excluded in Law. The diriment
impediments to a valid conjugal contract, therefore, bind
them. It would be well for the Catholic lawyer to have accurate information on these impediments." Such information
might at times allow him to go ahead on a case which he
would otherwise have to refuse to take in conscience.
3. The Unbaptized Plaintiff Seeking A Divorce.
A lawful marriage between non-baptized persons, although
not a sacrament, is certainly recognized as genuine by the
Church. Once it has been lawfully contracted the State has
no power to dissolve it. Those who request the help of the
Catholic lawyer in order to obtain release from it through
civil divorce must be treated in various ways dependent on
their intentions and the circumstances somewhat like baptized non-Catholic married persons.
There is this difference, however, that since unbaptized
persons are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Church, the
validity of their marriage contract is not affected by the laws
of the Church. There is no possibility of finding defects in
their marriage contract on the basis of ecclesiastical law
which would justify an appeal to the court for a divorce and
which would be tantamount to a declaration of nullity. Nevertheless, since many moralists admit that the State has the
power to lay down conditions prerequisite for the validity of
the marriage contract of those who have not been baptized,
the Catholic lawyer may find that the marriage from which
12 An article explaining the impediments will appear in the Spring 1954 Issue
of the NoTRE DAmE LAWYER.
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a plaintiff seeks divorce, is in fact invalid. He can lawfully,
then, institute legal proceedings to have the marriage annulled.
Albert L. Schlitzer, C.S.C.*
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